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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from the entry of Amended Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Amended Decree entered by the 
Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen, District Judge, following an 
appeal reversal, and remand by this court where the Trial 
Court, upon the oral motion of Plaintiff, without prior notice 
to Defendants, amended paragraph 5 of the Findings of Fact, 
contrary to this court's previous opinion, altering the 
Defendants7 right to receive culinary water. This Court has 
jurisdiction of this appeal under the provisions of Section 
78-2-2(3) (i) 1987 and Rule 3A of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This action was filed by Cornish Town against Evan 0. 
Koller and Marlene B. Roller in 1979 to determine the 
ownership of rights-of-way over the Rollers7 land and the 
ownership of culinary water used by Cornish and the Rollers 
from springs situated on the Roller property. The case was 
tried by the Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen on February 16, 
17 and 18 of 1983. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
a Judgment were entered on April 26, 1984. The Trial Court 
determined issues of rights-of-way, ownership of the water and 
held that the town had right to determine whether Rollers 
should be supplied water from the town's water supply or from 
the spring from which Rollers' reservation was made. 
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Defendants perfected an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court 
relative to the source of Defendants7 culinary water, damages 
and other matters. Plaintiff cross-appealed challenging the 
Trial Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and the 
division of the water. The matter was orally argued. On July 
20, 1988 the Supreme Court of the State of Utah rendered its 
decision affirming the Trial Court relative to all issues 
except the finding of the Trial Court relative to the source 
from which the Roller's culinary water must be supplied. See 
Cornish v. Roller, 758 P.2d 919 (1988). See Addendum B. 
The Supreme Court reversed the Trial Court holding that 
the town must comply with the provisions of the Rollers' deed 
reserving the water right from the Pearson Spring. The town 
must now provide the Defendants with culinary water from the 
Pearson Spring and not other sources of water. Following the 
decision by the Supreme Court, the Defendants submitted 
Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Amended 
Judgment consistent with the opinion of the Supreme Court. 
Defendants also sought to correct clerical errors in the 
Judgment. At the hearing on November 15, 1988, Plaintiff 
concurred with the Amended Findings of Fact in accordance with 
the decision of the Supreme Court but objected to the 
correction of some clerical errors and submitted written 
objections. 
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At the hearing, Counsel for Cornish, without prior notice 
to the Defendants, orally moved the Court to make an 
additional Finding of Fact to be added to the end of paragraph 
5 of the Findings of Fact regarding the location of Rollers' 
tap into the Cornish water line. The modification 
substantially affected Defendants' right to receive culinary 
water. The Court granted the Plaintiff's oral motion and on 
the 15th day of December, 1988, entered Amended Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Amended Judgment incorporating 
the substance of Plaintiff's oral motion. Written objections 
were made to the amended Finding of Fact incorporating the 
modified paragraph. See Addendum A. The Trial Court denied 
Defendants' motion objecting to the entry of the Amended 
Findings of Fact. Defendants thereafter filed a Notice of 
Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issue presented on appeal is: 
(1) Whether or not the Trial Court procedurally erred 
in entertaining the Plaintiff's oral motion to amend a finding 
of fact substantially modifying Defendants' water right, where 
the motion was made without notice to the Defendants, and was 
made more than 4 1/2 years after the entry of the initial 
Finding; and 
(2) Whether or not the Trial Court substantively erred 
in modifying the Findings of Fact made 4 1/2 years earlier. 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT STATUTORY 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
14th Amendment U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 
7 Utah Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE. This is a proceeding 
supplemental to remand on appeal by Cornish Town to amend the 
Findings of Fact signed by the Trial Court on April 26, 1984, 
which were subject to an appeal decided by this Court July 20, 
1988, and remanded for further proceedings consistant with the 
opinion. 
II. A COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BEFORE THE 
LOWER COURT. This case was tried before the Honorable VeNoy 
Christoffersen on February 16, 17 and 18 of 1983. The Court 
thereafter entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
a Judgment on April 26, 1984. The Defendants appealed from 
the Judgment of the District Court, relative to Findings 
involving the source of Defendants' culinary water supply. 
On the 20th day of July, 1988, this Court rendered its 
decision affirming the Trial Court relative to all issues 
except a finding of the Trial Court that the town may supply 
Defendants' water from the town's general water sources. 
The Supreme Court remanded the matter back to the 
District Court for "proceedings consistent with the decision." 
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The Defendants submitted Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and an Amended Judgment to the Court consistent with 
the decision of the Utah Supreme Court. In addition thereto, 
Rollers sought the correction of clerical errors appearing in 
the original Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
and Decree. The Plaintiff submitted written objections to the 
correction of the clerical errors. A hearing was held on the 
15th day of November, 1988, in the District Court of Cache 
County to resolve the issues brought before the Court by the 
submission of Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
a Judgment as evidenced by the Plaintiff's written objections. 
During the course of this hearing Plaintiff's Attorney orally 
moved to amend Finding of Fact No. 5. The .motion was made 
without notice to the Rollers as required by the Rules. In 
substance, Plaintiff's motion gives Cornish the right to alter 
the established point at which the Rollers' tap into the 
Cornish water line giving Cornish the option to substantially 
modify the culinary water the Rollers reserved. The Trial 
Court granted Plaintiff's oral motion. The Defendants' appeal 
from the Court's entertaining the motion and granting the 
motion as found in the Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law. 
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS. At the time of the initial 
trial of this matter on February 16, 17 and 18 of 1983, 
Defendants proffered evidence to the Court to the effect that 
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Plaintiff's predecessor in interest were the owners of a 
culinary water right from the Pearson Spring as evidenced by 
a Deed wherein: 
"Grantors reserve the right to use the 
water for human drinking and stock 
watering purposes. This use to be 
confined to a water flow through a 3/4 
inch tap, and Grantee agrees to pipe the 
said water to the home of Lars Pearson 
for culinary and domestic purposes. All 
water to be measured through a culinary 
water meter." 
Cornish v. Roller, 758 P.2d 919, 921 (Utah 1988). Addendum 
The Trial Court in the initial proceeding made and 
entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree. 
Cornish v. Roller, infra, page 920. Findings of Fact, 
paragraph 5, states as follows: 
5. Defendants' predecessor in interest 
reserved the right to use water for human 
drinking and stock watering purposes. 
This flow to be confined to a water flow 
through a 3/4 inch tap and Grantees agree 
to pipe the said water to • the home of 
Lars Pearson, Defendants' predecessor for 
culinary and domestic purposes. All 
water to be measured through a culinary 
water meter. The tap is 
situated approximately 50 feet west of 
the Defendants' residence. (Emphasis 
ours) 
Paragraph 5 contained material recitations relative to 
the appeal by Rollers to the Supreme court of the State of 
Utah. It was cited verbatim by the Supreme Court in its 
decision dated July 20, 1988. (See page 920) This Court 
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affirmed in part the decision of the Trial Court and reversed 
the decision of the Trial Court as it relates to Finding of 
Fact paragraph 20 which was as follows: 
20. The Court finds that the Defendants 
are to receive the water that Defendants 
are not entitled to say where they 
receive it from, and that the source is 
not restricted solely to the Pearson 
Spring. The Court finds that the 
Defendants are entitled to determine 
where the union with the Cornish line 
will be located and shall thereafter 
provide and pipe through a 3/4 inch tap 
to the home of the Defendants7 culinary 
water as set forth in the deed. 
(Emphasis ours) 
The Supreme Court held that since Rollers7 predecessor 
in interest did not own the Cornish water system, Rollers7 
predecessor in interest could not have reserved to themselves 
rights to the water from that system, and, therefore, Rollers 
were entitled to have their culinary water right, which was 
the subject of a conveyance, flow from the Pearson Spring. 
This Court recited but reversed no other Finding of Fact. 
See Cornish Town v. Roller, 758 P.2d 919 (Utah 1988). 
Following the decision by this Court Defendants 
submitted to Plaintiff Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. Record p.91-102, Paragraph 20 of the 
Findings of Facts was amended consistent with the opinion. 
Cornish made no objections to that amendment. (Tr. p. 34.) 
Defendants also sought to correct clerical errors made in the 
initial Findings of Fact, Judgment and Decree by including 
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State Engineer WUC numbers, (Tr. p. 24 to 33) changing dates 
of the irrigation season to conform to State Engineer 
records. (Tr. p.26) These issues were heard by the Trial 
Court and appropriate corrections of clerical errors were 
made by the Court in a hearing on November 15, 1988. At that 
hearing the Court had before it written objections which were 
properly noticed for hearing. At that hearing Counsel for 
Cornish, without notice to the Rollers and without submitting 
a written motion, orally moved the Court to make an 
additional Finding of Fact to be added to paragraph 5 of the 
Findings of Fact. (Tr. p. 5 - 22) Until that time neither 
party had appealed from, nor objected to paragraph 5 of the 
Findings of Fact. Over Rollers' objection Cornish proposed 
in the oral motion (Tr. p. 5) an amendment as follows to be 
added to the end of paragraph 5: 
However, as long as Cornish provides the 
water through a 3/4 inch tap from the 
Pearson Spring that complies with the 
deed regardless of where the tap is 
located in relation to the residence. 
Addendum A. 
Counsel for Cornish then represented to the Court that 
Cornish intended to construct a diversion box along Cornish's 
main water line and to situate a 3/4 inch tap into the 
diversion box from which Rollers7 water would then flow down 
hill to the Roller residence. (Tr. p. 8) Presently Rollers7 
tap into the water line 50 feet west of their house is at a 
pressure of 100+ psi. (Tr. p. 19-21) The amendment would 
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allow Cornish to situate the 3/4 inch restriction (tap) at a 
place where there is zero pressure, (Tr.p.20) thus 
dramatically limiting the amount of water Kollers may receive 
for culinary purposes. (Tr. p. 9) The Kollers objected to 
the amendment stating that Cornish was obligated to furnish 
water to the home of Lars Pearson where the Kollers might 
then tap into the line, which tap was situated approximately 
50 feet west of the residence. Cornish admitted that the 
intent of the amendment was to further quantify Kollers7 
water. (Tr. p. 2, line 20; Tr. p. 10, lines 16, 17) Cornish 
had tried to limit Rollers7 water by prior motions (Record p. 
13-14 and 33-34) without success. The Kollers claimed the 
motion was an attempt to retry the case. (Tr. p. 12) The 
Trial Court, without taking evidence, granted Plaintiff's 
Motion to amend paragraph 5 of the Findings of Fact. (Tr. p. 
22) Plaintiff's Counsel incorporated the amendment into 
Amended Findings of Fact along with the corrected clerical 
errors requested by Defendants and the Court thereafter 
executed Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law (Record 
p. 133-144) and an Amended Judgment (Record p. 146-153) 
Addendum A. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellants claim that the Trial Court procedurally erred 
in entertaining Plaintiff's oral motion to amend a finding of 
fact which had been unchanged since April 26, 1984, when the 
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original decree was entered. The motion, by Plaintiff, 
without prior notice to the Defendants, (notwithstanding the 
fact that it was orally made in the course of the hearing) 
fails to comply with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
the Code of Judicial Administration. Further, the Trial 
Court substantially erred in granting the Plaintiff7s oral 
motion as it is apparent that the Plaintiff was using the 
motion as a substitute for the appellate process to 
circumvent the Supreme Court's ruling by amending the 
paragraph whereby the town might be able to limit the 
quantity of water delivered to the Roller residence by 
changing the location of the Rollers' tap into the Cornish 
Town line to a point where the water would flow through the 
tap at a substantially reduced pressure thereby limiting 
gallonage. 
The issue having been decided and not appealed. The 
motion should not have been granted based upon the doctrine 
of res judicata and collateral estoppel. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
ORAL MOTION TO AMEND FINDING OF FACT NUMBER 5. 
Notwithstanding the fact that this case was on appeal 
from the Trial Court decision rendered April 26, 1984, 
Plaintiff on July 12, 1988, sought further clarification from 
the Trial Court regarding the extent of Rollers' water rights 
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and sought a permanent injunction to have the court establish 
a quantifiable limit on the amount of water Rollers could use 
from the Pearson Spring. A hearing was held and the Trial 
Court concluded that it had heard no evidence that the 
Defendants were wasting water or unreasonably using the 
water. Therefore, the Trial Court concluded on August 12, 
1988, that there was no necessity of quantifying the amount 
of Rollers7 water from the Pearson Spring. (Memo Decision 
August 30, 1988) In a second instance a water line had been 
replaced by the Rollers from Griffiths Spring (not involved 
in this case) by Rollers which the town objected to and upon 
hearing held August 12, 1988 and November 15, 1988, the Trial 
Court again denied Cornish's efforts to limit the water used 
by the Rollers. The oral motion made by Cornish Town on 
November 15th to amend paragraph 5 of the Findings of Fact 
was another attempt on the part of Cornish Town to limit or 
quantify waters received by the Rollers under the terms of 
their reservation. (Tr. p. 9, 10) All other motions, 
objections and matters heard by the Court on November 15th 
were in writing with notice given to opposing counsel. 
The Trial Court erred in entertaining the Plaintiff's 
Motion. Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides as follows: 
Findings of Fact, whether based on oral 
or documentary evidence, shall not be set 
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due 
regard shall be given to the opportunity 
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of the Trial Court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
Sub-paragraph (b) of the same rule provides as follows: 
Upon motion of any party not later than 
ten flOl days after the entry of the 
judgment the court may amend its findings 
of fact to make additional findings or 
may amend the judgment accordingly. 
(Emphasis added) 
The oral motion of Cornish Town fails to comply with 
Rule 52 of the URCP since judgment in this case was entered 
on April 26, 1984. The subject matter in Finding number 5 
was recited verbatim in the Supreme Court Decision, 758 P.2d 
at page 920, and neither party, during the course of the 
initial appeal, sought to object to nor amend this Finding of 
Fact. Therefore, under the provisions of Rule 52 the Trial 
Court erred in entertaining the Plaintiff's oral motion. 
Rule 59(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure relating 
to motions to alter or amend judgments provides that the 
motion shall not be made not later than ten (10) days after 
the entry of the judgment. Again, Plaintiff's motion, if 
brought under Rule 59(e) was not timely brought before the 
Court and the Trial Court had no alternative but to deny the 
motion. Burgess v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982). 
Article 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration 
adopted October, 1988, states as its intent the establishment 
of uniform procedures for the filing of motions, supporting 
memoranda and documents with the court. It also seeks to 
establish a uniform procedure for insuring timely and 
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adequate notice of matters placed on the law and motion 
calendar and set for hearing• It is therefore obvious that 
Plaintiff's oral motion, in the nature of a motion to make an 
additional finding or to amend the finding of fact made 
pursuant to Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
violates the letter and spirit of Rule 4-501 of the Code of 
Judicial Administration. 
For the Defendants to argue that the Rollers responded 
to the motion and were not prejudiced by the fact that the 
motion was made orally cannot justify the motion, (Tr. p. 17 
and 19) Had the Rollers received notice, evidence may have 
been obtained to show that the contemplated change of 
location of the tap into the line would have a significant 
effect upon the culinary water available to the Rollers for 
daily household uses and particularly in situations where 
water was necessary for fire fighting. The Trial Court, in 
entertaining the motion, deprived the Plaintiffs of a 
valuable property right without due process of law. Nelson 
v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983) 
The Defendants having failed to receive timely and 
adequate notice of the motion by the Plaintiff, were unable 
to respond to the motion with the introduction of evidence 
showing their detriment. 
Nor can Plaintiff use Rule 60(b) to amend the finding. 
Rule 60(b) relates to relief from a judgment. Findings No. 
13 
5 is not a judgment and therefore Rule 60(b) is not the 
proper rule to proceed under. Essentially Plaintiff's oral 
motion circumvented the court's motion practice and the 
appellate process and is 4 1/2 years late. Young v. Western 
Piling & Sheeting, 680 P.2d 394 (Utah 1984); Laub v. South 
Central Utah Telephone Association, 657 P.2d 1303 (Utah 
1982) . 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALTERING FINDING OF FACT NO. 5. 
The oral motion by the Plaintiff was not made to correct 
clerical error. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Disposition . 
concedes that fact. Plaintiff's oral motion was made for the 
purpose of re-interpreting paragraph 5. 
Plaintiff claims in their motion for summary disposition 
the issue is not determined in prior proceedings. However, 
the following conversation took place between court and 
counsel at page 18 of the transcript: 
Mr. Preston: ...it was the city's 
obligation to deliver water down to this 
point so that the Pearsons could tap into 
the line. 
The Court: It is the city's obligation 
to provide water off the Pearson Spring 
line through a 3/4 inch tap and then pipe 
it to the house. 
Mr. Preston: I don't think that's a 
reasonable interpretation of the deed. 
The Court: Well I know and I have not 
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Mr, Preston: Why did the Court find that 
the tap was 50 feet West of the 
residence? 
The Court: I guess because you told me that's 
where it was. 
Mr. Preston: And everything that you 
found in there is in the record 
somewhere, that is found in the record. 
Mr. Burnett: I am disputing the tap was 
in fact there. The question is the 
significance of that. Does it mean we 
can't change it? I don't see why we 
can't. 
Mr. Preston: I don't mind them changing 
the tap, but what they are doing is 
limiting the flow of the water by four 
times. 
The Court: Are they obligated under this 
deed to provide a 3/4 inch tap? 
Mr. Preston: That's right... at the home 
of Lars Pearson. 
The Court: No it doesn't say at the home 
of Lars Pearson. 
Mr. Preston: Then the Court found before 
it was at the home of Lars Pearson. Is 
the Court finding somewhere else? 
The Court: I am saying that's where you 
had the 3/4 inch tap which I guess was a 
fact. 
Mr. Preston: That's exactly. There was 
a 3/4 inch restriction at the home of 
Lars Pearson. 
Notwithstanding this conversation between Court and 
Counsel, the Trial Court allowed the Plaintiff to amend 
Finding of Fact no. 5 to include the following language: 
However, as long as Cornish provides the 
water through a 3/4 inch tap from the 
15 
Pearson Springs that complies with the 
deed, regardless of where the tap is 
located in relation to the residence. 
It is obvious from the record that the motion was a 
substantive amendment of a finding of fact which 
substantially altered the Defendants' rights to receive 
culinary water from the Pearson Springs. 
Defendants maintain presently (and have maintained 
throughout the course of these proceedings) that Cornish has 
the obligation, under the reservation, to provide water from 
the Pearson Spring's main line and to pipe the water to the 
Defendants' residence where the Defendants then may tap into 
the line with a 3/4 inch tap to provide culinary water to 
their residence. The Findings of Fact recited by this Court, 
(758 P. 2d at page 919, 920) in its decision, determine that 
issue as evidenced by the decision. 
Assuming, for the purpose of argument, the Plaintiff's 
motion complied with the Rules of Civil Procedure, it is 
Defendants' position that the issue of the location of 
Defendants' tap into the city's line is determined by Finding 
of Fact No. 5. The Doctrine of res judicata bars the 
Defendants from re-litigating the issue or from altering 
substantive rights determined by the court and not timely 
appealed from. 
Note, that no further evidentiary hearing was had at the 
request of the Plaintiff. Therefore, the Court apparently 
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granted the motion upon facts found by the Court at the trial 
in 1983 and recited by the Court in Findings of Fact entered 
on April 26, 1984, The Amended Findings of Fact No. 5 is now 
inconsistent with the amended Conclusions of Law where the 
Court concludes as follows: 
The Court further concludes that the Plaintiff, 
under such reservation, shall deliver to the 
Defendants' residence culinary water for human 
drinking and stock watering purposes through 
a 3/4 inch tap to the home of the Defendants 
for the purposes set forth in the grant and 
reservation of the deed. 
The only reasonable interpretation of the Conclusion of 
Law is as initially found by the Court. See also the Amended 
Judgment and Decree paragraph 11: 
The reservation of the culinary water 
rights set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4 
hereof is a water right from the waters 
flowing from Pearson Spring. The 
Defendants are entitled to have delivered 
to their home culinary water for human 
drinking and stock watering purposes 
through a 3/4 inch tap (a tap being 
defined as a 3/4 inch inside diameter 
service connection into a water main or 
distribution line) at Defendants' 
residence for the purposes set forth in 
the reservation including indoor plumbing 
and customary residential, culinary, 
domestic uses to exclude the use of the 
water in a fish pond and crop land 
irrigation and related uses. 
(Emphasis ours) 
Therefore, location of the tap into the line is central 
to the obligation of Cornish to deliver water to the home of 
the Defendants from the Pearson Spring. 
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Cornish argues in their answer to Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Disposition that the issue is open for decision on 
remand, arguing that the deed is silent as to the location of 
the tap and should now be the subject of further 
interpretation. The Defendants resist the argument for 
the following reasons: 
(1) The Trial Court in 1984 determined the point 
at which the Rollers tapped into the city's line 
which was situated 50 feet west of the Roller 
residence. 
(2) This finding was incorporated in paragraph 5 
of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
(3) The Findings, Conclusions and Judgment relating 
to the place where the Rollers tapped into the line 
was not the subject of an appeal nor was the subject 
of an objection timely filed by the Plaintiff and 
as such is now res judicata. 
This court in its prior decision recited the Findings of 
Fact as an integral part of the factual background for making 
its determination that the Rollers' reservation in the deed 
obligates Cornish to supply water to the Rollers from the 
Pearson Spring and to pipe the same to their residence where 
the Rollers may then tap into that line with a 3/4 inch 
service connection leading to their house. 
A. The doctrine of res judicata bars the amendment. 
18 
The recent case of Swainston v. Intermountain Health 
Care, 97 Utah Adv. Rep. p. 25, this court has said as follows: 
There are two branches of res ad judicata, 
claim preclusion and issue preclusion. 
Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 
1988). We first consider whether this 
appeal involves a claim or an issue. An 
issue may be described as a "certain and 
material point, affirmed by one party and 
denied by the other." Donahue v. 
Susquehanna Collieries Co. . 138 F.2d 3, 
4 (ed Cir. 1943). A court resolves an 
issue by making a finding of fact or a 
ruling on a matter of law. No relief is 
inherent in the resolution of an issue. 
The Swainston case holds that a factual finding is an 
issue. In Cornish v. Roller, 758 P. 2d 919 (Utah 1988) this 
court found issues relating to the facts set forth in Finding 
No. 5. The Swainston case defines a 3 prong test for 
preclusion of issues as follows: 
(1) Was the issue decided in the prior 
adjudication identical with the one 
presented in the action in question? 
The answer is clearly in the affirmative as the issue as 
to where the tap was located, both logically and factually 
was found to be at the house of Defendants, rather than 
situated in the middle of a distribution line, the town now 
proposes. 
(2) Was there a final judgment on the 
merits? 
The decree of the District Court dated April 26, 1984, 
was, in fact, a final judgment on the merits. Finding No. 5 
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was incorporated in the appeal process but was not the subject 
of a claimed error. 
(3) Was the party against whom the plea 
is asserted a party or in privity with 
the party to the prior action? 
The answer is yes. All parties are the same. 
(4) Was the issue in the first case 
fully, completely and fairly litigated? 
The Defendants assert that the matter was in fact fully, 
fairly and competently litigated. Evidence was taken and the 
case was tried over the course of three days. Almost one 
year was taken for the Trial Court to enter Findings of Fact. 
See also Copper State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387 
(Court of Appeals); Searle Brothers v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 
691 (Utah 1978); Madsen v. Borthick, 97 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 
(December 12, 1988); White Pine Ranches v. Osguthorpe, 731 
P.2d 1076 (Utah 1986); Schaer v. State ex rel. Utah Dep't of 
Transp., 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983). 
It is obvious that the reason a decision on the part of 
Cornish to change the 3/4 inch tap from the residence of 
Defendants to a point on the brow of the hill above 
Defendants' house is their recent reinterpretation of an old 
finding designed solely for the purpose of attempting to 
restrict Defendants7 culinary water supply. 
The last paragraph of this Court's decision in the case 
of Cornish v. Rollerf infra stated that the case was remanded 
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to the Trial Court for proceedings "consistent" with the 
opinion. The proceedings of the Trial Court were not 
consistent with this Court's opinion. See the case of Joseph 
Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 746 F. 2d 1437 (5th 
Circuit Court of Appeals): 
Under the law of the case doctrine both 
the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals generally are bound by findings 
of fact and conclusions of law made by 
the Court of Appeals in a prior appeal of 
the same case.... however, the law of the 
case doctrine does not apply to bar 
reconsideration of an issue when (1) a 
subsequent trial produces substantially 
different evidence, (2) controlling 
authority 
has since made a contrary decision of law 
applicable to that issue, or (3) the 
prior decision was clearly erroneous and 
would work a manifest in justice. 
The Court went on to reiterate that the law of the case 
doctrine protects against the agitation of settled issues and 
assures obedience of lower courts to the decision of 
appellate courts. The appellate court concluded that the 
Trial Court exceeded its authority on remand since its 
opinion was inconsistent with the initial Wheeler decision 
and the Trial Court disregarded the law of the case 
established therein. Similarly the District Court of Cache 
County exceed its authority on remand in amending a finding 
inconsistent with the balance of the facts and conclusions. 
The District Court of Cache County did not conduct a 
subsequent trial producing substantially different evidence 
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nor has the controlling authority changed nor does the prior 
decision clearly work a manifest injustice on either party. 
The remand in this case was neither a general reversal 
as found in Hutchins v. State of Idaho, 603 P.2d 995 (Idaho 
1979) nor does it deal with an issue not passed upon by the 
appellate court as suggested in Blinzer v. Andrews, 519 P.2d 
483 (Idaho 1973); Hulihee v. Heirs of Hueu. 556 P.2d 920 
(Hawaii 1976). 
If Rollers7 motion to correct clerical errors were 
substantive modifications they too should have been denied as 
such. It is obvious that the Plaintiff's oral motion to 
amend was substantive and should have also been denied. 
Neither party has the right to claim that because the other 
party attempted a substantive modification of the decree that 
justifies the other party making substantive modifications. 
CONCLUSION 
At some point in this litigation there must be a 
conclusion of the proceedings. Hidden Meadows Development v. 
Mills, 590 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1979) at page 1249. The doctrine 
of Res Judicata stands exactly for that proposition. (IB 
Moore's Federal Practice, 186) The present point at which 
Rollers tap into the Cornish water line, 50 feet west of the 
Roller residence, has been in place since 1938. That fact 
was embodied in Findings of Fact entered by the District 
Court in 1984, recited by this Court in 1988. The fact was 
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not only necessary as an interpretation of the deed, but as 
a finding of fact which was a predicate to a determination by 
the Supreme Court. 
The District Court of Cache County erred in entertaining 
an oral motion by Cornish Town in violation of established 
case law and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court 
compounded that error in granting Plaintiffs motion thus 
substantively amending a finding of fact now inconsistent 
with the conclusions of law and Decree and in violation of 
this Court's remand order where this Court remanded the case 
to the District Court for proceeding consistent with the 
opinion. 
Defendants request this Court reverse the District Court 
of Cache County, strike the last sentence of paragraph 5 of 
the Amended Findings of Fact and enter the Amended Findings 
of Fact, Conclusion^ of Law, Judgment and Decree as written. 
„, , S 
DATED this
 lfi day of Ma/, 1989. 
W. Pres€on 
PRESTON & CHAMBERS 
M. Byron Fisher 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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Northwest quarter of the Southwest quarter of Section 
8, Township 14 North of Range One West of the Salt 
Lake Meridian, which said water is now being used and 
has been used for more than forty years on West half 
of the Southeast quarter of Section 8, Township 14 
North of Range One West of the Salt Lake Meridian. 
Together with a right of way over the land of the 
grantors including an easement for travel and the 
right to construct, operate and maintain water pipe 
lines with all accessories thereto, to carry said 
water from spring to reservoir over the land described 
as follows: 
A 20 foot right of way over the Southeast quarter of 
Section 8, and the Northeast quarter of Section 17, 
Township 14 North, Range One West of the Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian. 
Grantors reserve the right to use water for human 
drinking and stock watering purposes. This use to be 
confined to a water flow through a 3/4" tap, and 
grantee agrees to pipe the said water to the home of 
Lars Pearson for culinary and domestic purposes. All 
water to be measured through a culinary meter. 
5. Defendants' Predecessor in interest reserved the right 
to use water for human drinking and stock watering purposes. 
This use to be confined to a water flow through a 3/4 inch tap 
and Grantees (Cornish) agreed to pipe the said water to the 
home of Lars Pearson, Defendants' predecessor, for culinary and 
domestic purposes. All water to be measured through a culinary 
water meter. The tap is presently situated approximately 50 
feet West of the Defendants' residence. However, as long as 
Cornish provides the water through a 3/4 inch tap from the 
Pearson Spring, that complies with the deed, regardless of 
where the tap is located in relation to the residence. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
Cornish Town, a Utah municipal No. 19981 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, Appellee, 
and Cross-Appellant, 
F I L E D 
V. J u l y 2 0 , 1988 
Evan O. Koller and Marlene B. 
Koller, husband and wife, 
Defendants, Appellants, 
and Cross-Appellees. Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
First District, Cache County 
The Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen 
Attorneys: George W. Preston, Logan, for Appellants 
Reed L. Martineau, Jody K. Burnett, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
Corjuj.©n xwwii v varnish") initiated this action after 
a dispute arose over certain water rights and rights of way, 
Kollers counterclaimed for expenses associated with installing 
a waterline between Pearson Spring and their home. The case 
was tried to the court, without a jury. Thereafter, the 
court, ruling from the bench, entered findings of fact and 
conclusions of law providing in pertinent part: 
•ci"rvrT>-rvjY"«c: r*T? r»*r*m 
3. The Defendants are the owners of 
real property surrounding the Pearson 
Spring . • • and presently receive water 
for culinary and domestic purposes at 
their home through a private water line 
which is connected to the Plaintiff's line 
that carries water from the Pearson Spring 
to the Plaintiff's reservoir and treatment 
facilities. 
4. That by deed . . . [certain named 
parties, including Defendants' predecessor 
in interest] conveyed to Cornish Town 
[among other things, certain water rights]. 
5. Defendants['] Predecessor in 
interest reserved the right to use water 
for human drinking and stock watering 
purposes. This use to be confined to a 
water flow through a 3/4 inch tap and 
Grantees (Cornish) agreed to pipe the 
said water to the home of Lars Pearson, 
Defendants^] predecessor, for culinary 
and domestic purposes. All water to be 
measured through a culinary water meter. 
The tap is situated approximately 50 
feet West of the Defendants' residence. 
6. That the Defendants acquired the 
right, title and interest . . . as it 
relates to the water right to be used 
through the 3/4 inch tap. 
7. That Emma Marie Pearson Dobbs, 
the owner of an undivided one-fifth 
interest in and to the Spring set 
forth above, did not convey her interest 
to Cornish Town, but by deed conveyed 
such water rights and real property to 
the Defendants herein as set forth in a 
deed . . . . 
13. The Court finds from the 
testimony of the witnesses that Cornish 
Town has not be [sic] reason of the nature 
of its improvements in the Pearson Spring 
Basin area, effectively controlled and 
appropriated all of the water coming from 
the Pearson Spring area. 
14. The Pearson Spring water flowing 
down Butler Hollow has been beneficially 
used by the Pearsons and their successors 
the Rollers. 
15. That Plaintiff's evidence has 
failed to show a five-year period of 
non-use from the Pearson Spring. 
16. That the Defendants are the 
owners of 1/5 interest in the Pearson 
Spring to cover the irrigation period from 
April 1st to September 30th, together with 
year round stock watering rights as set 
forth in the Kimball Decree . • . . 
17. That Defendants have the right 
to have their share of water from Pearson 
Spring flow into Butler Hollow during the 
irrigation period as described above and 
for stock watering. 
18. That the Defendants are the 
owners of the rights to culinary water 
from the Pearson Spring as set forth 
in the quit claim deed from Emma Pearson 
. . . . By reason thereof the Defendants 
are not an appropriator of the water and 
Defendants' rights are fixed by the grant 
in the deed to Emma Pearson, et al[.] and 
her successors in interest . . . . 
20. The Court finds that the 
Defendants are entitled to receive the 
water but that Defendants are not entitled 
to say where they receive it from, and 
that the source is not restricted solely 
to the Pearson Spring. The Court finds 
that the Plaintiff is entitled to deter-
mine where the union with the Cornish line 
will be located and shall thereafter pro-
vide and pipe through a 3/4 inch tap to 
the home of the Defendants, culinary water 
as set forth in the deed. 
21. The Court finds that the Pearson 
Spring water supply is not one single 
spring, but may be composed of several 
22. That Defendants' Counterclaim 
for damages for the installation of a 
pipeline is hereby denied. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
3. That judgment should enter 
decreeing that the Defendants are the 
owners of a right to a one-fifth in 
Pearson Spring to cover the irrigation 
period from April 1st to September 30th 
of each year and for stock watering and 
domestic purposes as adjudicated in the 
Kimball Decree to flow down Butler Hollow. 
4. That Defendants are not an 
appropriator of the tap water from the 
Cornish Municipal water system, but are 
the owners of a right to culinary water 
as evidenced by a grant in a deed • . . 
from Emma Pearson . . . . 
5. The Court concludes that the 
grant of the water right is not restricted 
solely to the source of water of Pearson 
Spring. The Court further concludes that 
the Plaintiff is entitled to determine 
where the union will be with the Cornish 
line and to provide and pipe through a 3/4 
inch tap to the home of Defendants for the 
purposes set forth in the grant. 
6. That Defendants are not entitled 
to prevail on Defendants' Counterclaim. 
Judgment was entered in accordance with these findings, and the 
parties brought their respective appeals. 
II 
Rollers first argue on appeal that the trial court 
erred by finding that Cornish had the right to determine the 
point of connection of Rollers' culinary waterline with the 
Cornish water system. They claim their right to receive 
culinary water arises from a reservation in a deed given by 
Rollers' predecessors in interest (Pearsons) to Cornish wherein 
water rights in and to "one certain unnamed spring," now known 
as the Pearson Spring, were conveyed. Accordingly, Rollers 
contend that they are entitled to receive their water from the 
Pearson Spring and not Cornish's general culinary water supply. 
Cornish responds that the deed is silent concerning the loca-
tion of the tap with the point of connection to Cornish's water 
system. 
The deed, wherein several members of the Pearson 
family granted "[a]11 the right, title and interest . . . in 
all water and water rights in and to one certain unnamed 
spring," which is now known as Pearson Spring, contains the 
following provision: 
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Grantors reserve the right to use 
water for human drinking and stock-watering 
purposes.. This use to be confined to a 
water flow through a 3/4" tap, and grantee 
agrees to pipe the said water to the home 
of Lars Pearson, for culinary and domestic 
purposes. All water to be measured 
through a culinary meter. 
Resolution of this first issue requires construction of the 
grant. Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-10 (1980) provides that water 
rights shall be transferred by deed in substantially the same 
manner as real estate, with an exception which is not relevant 
here. Accordingly, the rules governing the construction of 
deeds generally apply when construing an instrument conveying 
water rights.1 The primary rule regarding construction of 
deeds is to give effect to the intentions of the parties as 
expressed in the deed as a whole.2 In this regard, we have 
stated that in the absence of ambiguity, the construction of 
a deed is a question of law for the court.3 In such a case, 
we are not bound by the trial court's determination of the 
meajiing of the writing.4 
In the instant case, the trial court concluded that 
Kollers' water right under the deed was not restricted "solely 
to the source of water of Pearson Spring." However, the plain 
language of the deed indicates that the grantors "reserved" in 
themselves the water rights indicated. By its very nature, a 
"reservation" is a clause in a deed or other instrument of con-
veyance by which the grantor creates and reserves to himself 
some right, interest, or profit relative to the estate granted. 
Ownership is one of the conditions which must exist as the 
basis of a valid reservation.5 Since Rollers' predecessors in 
interest, the Pearsons, did not own the Cornish water system, 
the Pearsons could not have "reserved" to themselves rights to 
water from that system. Indeed, Cornish's brief appears to 
indicate that its water system was net even built at the time 
of the conveyance. Instead, the Pearsons must have "reserved" 
in themselves rights in the water which was the subject of the 
conveyance, namely, the water flowing from Pearson Spring. 
1. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-10 (1980); see also 93 C.J.S. 
Waters § 190, at 986 (1956). 
2. Chournos v. D'Agnillo, 642 P.2d 710, 712 (Utah 1982); 
Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653, 656 (Utah 1979). 
3. Hartman, 596 P.2d at 656. 
4. See id. 
5. See id. at 656-57. 
In view of this analysis, the arguments advanced by 
Cornish are unavailing. If Cornish did not desire to supply 
water under the deed from a specific source of water, it 
should not have accepted a deed containing this reservation. 
Accordingly, we find Rollers' first point to have merit, 
requiring a partial reversal of the judgment in this case. 
Ill 
Rollers' next point is that the trial court erred 
by finding that the "Pearson Spring water supply is not one 
single spring, but may be composed of several springs." 
Rollers' argument fails for several reasons. First, review of 
findings of fact is controlled by rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. To mount a successful challenge to trial 
court findings under that rule, an appellant must marshall the 
evidence supporting the trial court's findings. Only then can 
we determine whether those findings are clearly erroneous. 
Because Rollers have failed to make such a showing in this 
case, the trial court's determination will not be disturbed.6 
Second, Rollers have failed to provide the Court with 
the entire transcript of the proceedings below. This Court 
has repeatedly held that an appellant may not succeed on a 
claim of error when relevant portions of the record are not 
before us; in such a case, the proceedings before the trial 
court are presumed to support the trial court's findings.7 
For the above reasons, we find Rollers' second point to be 
without merit. 
IV 
Rollers' third point is that the trial court erred 
by dismissing their counterclaim. The trial court determined 
that Rollers were not entitled to recover on their counter-
claim, which was brought to capture the cost of installing a 
new pipeline. Rollers installed the pipeline atter Cornish 
advised them that it had no responsibility to replace the 
line. In ruling on the counterclaim from the bench, the trial 
court stated: 
6. See Redevelopment Agency v. Tanner, 740 P.2d 1296, 1301 
(Utah 1987) . 
7. Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 498, 498 (Utah 1986) (per 
curiam); Wood v. Myrup, 681 P.2d 1255, 1257 (Utah 1984); see 
In re Cluff's Estate, 587 P.2d 128, 128 n.l (Utah 1978); see 
also Union Bldg. Materials Corp. v. Rakaako, 5 Haw.- App. 
146, , 682 P.2d 82, 86-88 (1984), reconsideration granted, 
5 Haw. App. 683, 753 P.2d 253. 
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As to the damages, there is testimony 
and I feel that under this Cornish was 
obligated to provide the water as 
previously stated and in the deed. 
There's testimony that they were not 
doing so, there's testimony that they 
refused to do anything about it. Now I 
feel that Mr. Roller had the right then 
to go see about his water pressure. And 
he testified that when he opened it up 
he found it full, the T, full of debris, 
roots, clogging his water. And I feel 
that he would have a right to replace 
that and put it in the proper shape to 
get his pressure. There's no evidence 
there's anything wrong with the rest of 
the line. I just think he went too far. 
This doesn't give him a right to design 
his own water system, change its loca-
tion, when he could make his own remedy 
and would be required I think and could 
charge the bill to correct the problem 
at the place where it came out of the T, 
and that's the only evidence we have that 
there was anything wrong with it. There 
isn't any evidence there was anything 
wrong with the line going all the way 
down to the house so he could put in his 
other one. 
[Defense Counsel]: There was evidence 
that the bottom of the line was also 
filled up and its size was becoming 
smaller than the restriction. 
THE COURT: I know, but there is no 
evidence that you couldn't have—that 
you had to replace this whole line, put 
in a different place with four-inch pipe 
or even replace the whole line. All that 
line that's left there under the ground, 
you might still be able, if you get a 
proper connection on it, will work fine. 
I just say that on the Counterclaim you 
failed to convince me by the preponderance 
of the evidence that all of that was 
necessary. I'm convinced by the pre-
ponderance of the evidence there was 
something needed to be done up to where 
the water came out of that piece that you 
got in evidence, but that's about as far 
as I say your proof went. 
7 
Now if you have a specific bill on 
that portion of it I'll grant judgment 
for that. But I didn't peruse those bills 
enough to pick that out. But not the 
whole line from where you change direction 
and go all the way down the hill. 
Rollers have not drawn the Court's attention to any evidence on 
this issue contradicting the trial court's perception thereon. 
Therefore, we find this point of Kollers' appeal to be without 
merit. 
V 
Finally, Cornish in its cross-appeal contends that the 
trial court erred in failing to clarify the respective seasonal 
water rights of the parties and in concluding that Kollers held 
a one-fifth interest in the Pearson Spring. As support for 
these claims, Cornish argues that Kollers and their predeces-
sors forfeited the disputed water right by the absence of any 
beneficial use thereof. Also, Cornish contends that Kollers 
should be equitably estopped from claiming the one-fifth 
interest by virtue of acquiescence to Cornish's use of all the 
Pearson Spring water in the town's construction and ongoing 
maintenance of its municipal waterworks. We disagree. 
Again, the designated record on appeal contains only a 
partial transcript of the proceedings involved.8 Therefore, we 
are unable to review the evidence as a whole and must presume 
that the trial court's ruling was founded upon admissible, 
competent, and substantial evidence.9 
Furthermore, Cornish's claims appear predicated on our 
acceptance of its version of the testimony which was given and 
how the trial court should have perceived the circumstances as 
they existed. However, the facts Cornish advances in support 
of its arguments are chosen to the exclusion of other evidence 
in the partial record we have before us supporting the lower 
court's decision. Due to the trial court's advantaged position, 
the presumptions favor its judgment.10 Where there is dispute 
and disagreement in the evidence, we assume that the trial court 
believed those aspects and fairly drew the inferences to be 
derived therefrom which gave its decision support.11 To this 
end, the trial court did not find credible the evidence and 
8. See R. Utah S. Ct. 11(e)(2). 
9. Id.; see also Smith v. Vuicich, 699 P.2d 763, 764-65 (Utah 
1985) (per curiam). 
10. Redevelopment Agency, 740 P.2d at 1301-02. 
11. Id. 
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testimony Cornish presented. Instead, the court viewed the 
evidence as supporting the determination that Kollers main-
tained a one-fifth interest in the water from Pearson Spring 
and that the watering period runs as specified* Given the 
record before us and the facts of this case, these determina-
tions do not merit reversal herein* 
Based upon the foregoing, the decision of the trial 
court is affirmed in part and reversed in part and the case is 
remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Each 
party to bear its own costs. 
WE CONCUR: 
Richard C. Howe, Associate 
Chief Justice 
I. Daniel Stewart, Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
9 No. 19981 
